What you get

The answer to the question nobody likes to ask out loud: what am I actually paying for. Offer by offer: what happens before testing, during it, and what you hold at the end.

Price ₹4,999

Fixed price. Request it through the form, no call needed.

Before testing

  • Signed rules of engagement and written authorisation, by email.
  • The one flow or API area, the URL, a test account and the window, confirmed in writing.

During testing

  • Critical findings are reported the same day.
  • Testing stays inside the one flow or area.
  • No real customer data is touched or kept.

Delivered at the end

  1. A 5 to 8 page report in the format of the sample reportA short summary, the scope and method, and one page per finding with evidence, impact, fix and retest status.
  2. A walkthrough call with your engineersThirty minutes, going through each finding with the people who will fix it.
  3. One retestWithin thirty days of the report. The report is reissued as version 1.1 with every finding marked fixed or open.

What a typical check covers

  • The one flow or API area you name, tested as an attacker would: authentication and sessions, access control, input handling and business logic

What it does not cover

  • Anything outside the one flow or area
  • Source-code review
  • Load testing
  • A promise that every vulnerability was found

Request this

How we keep your data safe during a test

  • Authorisation first: signed rules of engagement and written authorisation before anything is touched.
  • Test accounts that you create. We never ask for a real customer’s credentials.
  • No real customer data is kept. Where a finding exposes personal data we capture the minimum, redact it in the report and tell you the same day.
  • Evidence is stored encrypted and deleted thirty days after sign-off.
  • Reports are delivered as a password-protected PDF or an expiring link.

Templates, free to use

  • Report templateThe shape every finding follows: title, severity, steps, evidence, impact, fix, retest.Read, opens in a new tabMarkdown file
  • Rules of engagementThe working agreement we sign before any test: people, scope, windows, what is allowed, data handling.Read, opens in a new tabMarkdown file
  • Scope sheetOne page that says what will be tested, where, by whom and when.Draft, under review by the founders. Not yet published.
  • Scoping-call checklistThe questions we ask in the fifteen-minute call, or by email when a form replaces the call.Draft, under review by the founders. Not yet published.

What the paper looks like

Three pages from the redacted sample documents: a security finding, a QA defect and the one-page summary. Nothing in them is a real client.

A finding card

BF-0914-03

Insecure direct object reference on the orders endpoint

Severity
HighCVSS 3.1 base score 7.1, vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Status
Fixed and retested
Summary

Any signed-in customer can read any other customer’s order, including name, phone number and delivery address, by changing the numeric id in the URL. Order ids are sequential, so the whole order history can be enumerated.

Steps to reproduce
  1. Sign in as a test customer and place an order. Note the order id in the confirmation URL.
  2. Request the order via the API with the test customer’s token. The response is correct.
  3. Change the id to the previous number and repeat the request with the same token.
  4. The response returns another customer’s order with personal data.
Evidence
GET /api/v1/orders/48212 HTTP/1.1
Host: api.redacted.in
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.redacted
Accept: application/json

Request made with the test customer’s token. Order 48212 belongs to a different account.

Impact

Personal data of every customer is readable by any other customer. Under the DPDP Act this is a reportable personal data breach. The sequential ids make bulk extraction a one-line script.

Fix

Scope the lookup to the signed-in customer and return 404 when the order is not theirs, so the endpoint does not confirm that an id exists. Add an authorisation test to the API suite so the check cannot regress.

// before
const order = await orders.findById(req.params.id);
if (!order) return res.status(404).end();
return res.json(order);
Retest

Retested on 18 September 2026. Requests for other customers’ orders now return 404 with an empty body. The authorisation test runs in CI on every pull request. Status: fixed.

A QA defect card

Severity scale

  • Info
  • Low
  • Medium
  • High
  • Critical

The same five stops as the stress map on the object.

QA-2409-03

Removing a coupon after a quantity change keeps the discount on the screen

Severity
High Blocks release: the customer is charged more than the total they were shown
Status
Fixed in rc2, regression test added

Summary

Apply a coupon, change a quantity, then remove the coupon. The cart keeps showing the discounted total while the server charges the full amount. The screen lies; the card statement does not.

Environment

Staging. Reproduced in Chrome 130 on Windows 11 and Safari on iOS 18, signed in and as a guest.

Steps to reproduce

  1. Add one item to the cart and apply the coupon TEST10.
  2. Change the quantity to two. The total updates and keeps the discount.
  3. Remove the coupon.
  4. Proceed to payment and pay with a test card.

Expected and actual

Expected
Removing the coupon returns the total to the full price before payment.
Actual
The cart shows 4,498 after removal. The payment request and the charge are 4,998.

Evidence

cart.total (screen)   4498.00  discount: TEST10 (stale)
POST /api/v1/payments  amount: 4998.00  coupon: null
charge.succeeded       amount: 4998.00

Console log from the staging build, with the request to the payment service

Root cause

The quantity change recalculates line totals in the browser from a cached discount and never asks the server again. Removing the coupon clears it on the server but not in the cached calculation. The server is right; the screen is wrong.

Fix and retest

Totals now come from the server on every cart change, and the payment screen refuses to continue if the displayed total and the server total differ. Retested on rc2 on 26 September 2026 across all four paths: totals match. A regression test covers the sequence on every pull request.

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The one-page summary

Application security assessment

Summary for the people who sign

Summary

Testing ran from 1 to 12 September 2026 against the customer web app and the public API, manually, against the OWASP Top 10 and the OWASP Web Security Testing Guide. This sample shows one finding, page 7: high severity, fixed and retested on 18 September 2026. The other rows are withheld in the sample.

Severity scale

SeverityFoundFixedOpen
Criticalredactedredactedredacted
High110
Mediumredactedredactedredacted
Lowredactedredactedredacted
Inforedactedredactedredacted

What we tested

  • Login and sessions
  • Access control, for example IDOR, as in the sample finding
  • Input handling: injection and cross-site scripting
  • Business logic: price, coupon and quota tampering
  • File uploads

What we did not test

  • Anything outside the signed scope
  • Social engineering
  • Physical security
  • Source-code review, unless bought

Fix

The one thing to do next: add an authorisation test to the API suite for every object lookup, so the class of finding on page 7 cannot come back.

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